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LEGAL MALPRACTICE FORUM
U
Punishing Ethical Violations:
Aggravating and Mitigating Factors
by H. Patrick FurmanIn the past several years, the Colo-
rado Supreme Court seems to
have increased the severity of
sanctions meted out to lawyers
who violate the Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility. The court often rejects the
recommendations of the Grievance
Committee and imposes a harsher sanc-
tion than that recommended by the
Committee.
The body of law relating to the pun-
ishment of lawyers is growing weekly.
The court uses both case law and the
American Bar Association Standards
for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions ("Stan-
dards"),' adopted by the ABA in 1986,
when meting out punishment. The pun-
ishment phase of disciplinary proceed-
ings is taking on more of the charac-
teristics of sentencing in a criminal case:
lawyer discipline and criminal sentenc-
ing share many of the same underlying
purposes and use many of the same cri-
teria for determining the appropriate
punishment.
This article briefly reviews the gener-
al criteria for imposing sanctions that
are set out by the Standards and re-
views the factors the court uses, in both
aggravation and mitigation, to deter-
mine sanctions against lawyers who vio-
late their ethical obligations. Finally,
the article looks at probation as an al-
ternative in sanctioning lawyers.
Column Ed.: Craig Fleishman of
Gelt, Fleishman & Sterling, P.C.,
Denver-861-1000
General Considerations
It is important to note at the outset
that the punishment recommended by
the Grievance Committee is advisory
only. The court "has the independent re-
sponsibility to determine appropriate
discipline." 2 The court often imposes a
sanction different (and, perhaps, heav-
ier) than the recommended sanction. In
doing so, the court relies heavily on the
Standards. The court's repeated use of
the Standards indicates the justices'
agreement with the principle, set out in
the Standards, that truly effective
lawyer discipline requires adherence to
a clearly defined set of criteria in deter-
mining punishment.3
The primary goal of the sanctioning
system adopted in the Standards is to
protect the public. The other goals are to
protect the integrity of the legal system,
insure the proper administration of jus-
tice, deter future unethical behavior by
the lawyer involved, rehabilitate the
lawyer if rehabilitation is appropriate
and educate the public and the profes-
sion generally, in order to deter unethi-
cal behavior among all members of the
profession.4 These goals are similar to
many of the purposes of the Colorado
Criminal Code in CRS § 18-1-102.5 with
respect to sentencing. The appropriate
sanction is determined with reference to
these goals.
The Standards set out a model that
courts may follow when imposing sanc-
tions. The model requires the court to
answer four questions:
1) what ethical duty the lawyer vio-
lated;
2) what the lawyer's mental state
was;
3) what the extent was of the poten-
tial or actual injury caused by the
conduct; and
4) whether there are any aggravat-
ing or mitigating circumstances.'
Standards 4.0 through 8.4 provide the
sanctions that generally are appropriate
for the various types of violations. The
aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances are then used to justify devia-
tions from that sanction. Again, there is
a similarity to parts of the model used in
sentencing in criminal caseS6 and to the
principle that mens rea is part of the
culpability requirement in criminal cas-
es.7 The Colorado Supreme Court gener-
ally follows this model. Each of these
four main factors is discussed briefly in
the following section.
The Four Main Factors
The nature of the duty that is violated
has a major impact on the type of sanc-
tion imposed. The duties lawyers owe to
clients (such as loyalty, diligence, com-
petence and candor) are considered the
most important duties,8 and violations
of these duties generally are punished
more severely under the Standards
than are violations of duties owed to the
profession or to the justice system.
This month's article was written by H.
Patrick Furman, Boulder, a clinical pro-
fessor of law at the Legal Aid & Defend-
er Program at the CU Law School.
THE COLORADO LAWYER Februaiy
The mental state of the lawyer who
commits the violation is the second ma-
jor factor in determining the appropri-
ate sanction. The mental states de-
scribed in the Standards are those of
"intent, knowledge, and negligence."9 As
in criminal law, an intentional violation
of an ethical duty is considered more
serious than a knowing violation of an
ethical duty, which, in turn, is consid-
ered more serious than a negligent vio-
lation. For example, a lawyer who deals
with client property improperly normal-
ly will be suspended if he or she acted
knowingly, but only publicly censuredo
if the lawyer acted negligently."
The third major factor is the extent of
the actual or potential injury caused by
the unethical action of the lawyer. It is
important to remember that actual in-
jury need not have occurred; potential
injury is just as serious as the actual in-
fliction of injury. For example, as noted
above, the Standards recommend a pub-
lic censure of a lawyer who deals negli-
gently with client property. The recom-
mended sanction is reduced to an ad-
monition 2 if the actions of the lawyer
caused little or no actual or potential in-
jury to the client.13 '
The final major factor to be consid-
ered when imposing sanctions is the
presence of aggravating or mitigating
factors. The balance of this article is de-
voted to a discussion of these factors as
used by the Colorado Supreme Court in
disciplining lawyers.
Aggravating and
Mitigating Factors
Aggravating factors under the Stan-
dards are those considerations that may
justify an increase in the degree of disci-
pline to be imposed. The ten factors list-
ed in Standard 9.2 are (1) prior disci-
plinary offenses, (2) dishonest or selfish
motive, (3) a pattern of misconduct, (4) a
multiplicity of offenses, (5) obstructing
the disciplinary process, (6) deceptive
practices in connection with the disci-
plinary process, (7) a lack of acknowl-
edgement of the wrongful conduct, (8)
the vulnerability of the victim of the
conduct, (9) substantial experience in
the practice of law and (10) indifference
toward making restitution.
Mitigating factors under the Stan-
dards are those considerations that may
justify a reduction in the degree of disci-
pline to be imposed. The thirteen factors
listed in Standard 9.3 are (1) the ab-
sence of a prior disciplinary record, (2)
the absence of any selfish or dishonest
motive, (3) personal or emotional prob-
lems, (4) good faith efforts to make resti-
tution or mitigate the damage caused,
(5) cooperation with the disciplinary
process, (6) inexperience in the practice
of law, (7) character, (8) physical or men-
tal impairment, (9) any delay in the dis-
ciplinary process, (10) interim rehabili-
tation, (11) the imposition of other sanc-
tions, (12) remorse and (13) the remote-
ness of prior offenses.
Over the past few years, the Colorado
Supreme Court has used these aggra-
vating and mitigating factors extensive-
ly in determining the appropriate sanc-
tion. No specific weight is assigned to
any factor and, in most cases, more than
one factor is involved. The court engages
in a general balancing of the factors.
The most commonly used factors are
discussed in the following sections.
Prior Disciplinary Record
The presence of prior disciplinary of-
fenses is an aggravating factor and the
absence of any prior disciplinary record
is a mitigating factor. The mitigating
value of a "clean record" is significantly
reduced when counsel has only recently
been licensed to practice law.u" Under
Standard 9.32(m), the remoteness in
time of a prior offense is considered a
mitigating factor. However, the Colo-
rado Supreme Court has not accepted
remoteness in time as a mitigator, as
discussed below.
In Colorado, even relatively minor
prior offenses are used in aggravation.
The Colorado Supreme Court has used
prior disciplinary offenses in aggrava-
tion when the prior offense was only a
negligent offense punished with a letter
of admonition and private sanction.15
Obviously, the court uses more serious
prior offenses in aggravation, as well.16
The remoteness of the prior disci-
plinary offense does not appear to be a
mitigating factor in Colorado. The court,
at most, seems to use the remoteness of
a prior offense only to lessen the impact
of what otherwise is considered an ag-
gravating factor. For example, in People
v. Good,'7 the Grievance Committee did
not consider counsel's prior suspension
as an aggravating factor because it was
based on conduct that was from fifteen
to twenty years old. However, the court
held that the prior discipline was still a
relevant factor to be considered in im-
posing discipline. The court also pointed
out that some of the current disciplinary
offenses were similar to the prior disci-
plinary offenses and began only two or
three years after counsel was reinstated
following the initial discipline. 8
Similarly, in People v. Barber,19 the
court rejected the remoteness of the pri-
or disciplinary offense as a mitigating
factor when the prior offense occurred
only three years prior to the offense in
question. The court noted that counsel
had been put on notice, at the time of
the prior offense, that subsequent of-
fenses would bring a harsher sanction.
Dishonest or Selfish Motive
The presence of a dishonest or selfish
motive is an aggravating factor under
the Standards. The absence of the same
is a mitigating factor. A dishonest or
selfish motive usually is evidenced by
an intention to receive a financial bene-
fit.
In People v. Shipp,20 counsel agreed to
pay a jail inmate a referral fee for cases
the inmate referred to the attorney. This
violation of the ban on referral fees es-
tablished by DR 2-103(B) was aggravat-
ed by the intent to secure financial gain.
The court rejected the Grievance Com-
mittee recommendation of a public cen-
sure and suspended counsel for sixty
days.21
In People v. Franks, counsel took
money from clients, did little or no work,
and then left the country. The court
found that a selfish or dishonest motive
was present and used this finding, along
with other aggravating factors, to disbar
counsel. 22 The absence of a selfish mo-
tive has been used a number of times as
a mitigating factor.u
Personal Problems and Character
The court will consider the presence
of personal or emotional problems as a
mitigating factor. Problems that the
court has considered include financial
difficulties, 4 family tragedieS25 and
physical or mental disabilities, includ-
ing alcoholism.26
Evidence of such problems or disabili-
ties must be presented to the hearing
panel if the court is to consider them.
Mere argument that they exist will not
suffice.' 7 If substance abuse was a par-
tial cause of the unethical behavior,
counsel's effort to deal with the problem
can mitigate the sanction.?'
Cooperation with the
Disciplinary Process
The Colorado Supreme Court views
cooperation with the disciplinary pro-
cess as a mitigating factor and non-coop-
eration as an aggravating factor. Total
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non-cooperation, in the form of a failure
to respond to the disciplinary complaint,
will result in the court entering a de-
fault judgment and deeming the allega-
tions of the complaint admitted.2 In ad-
dition to the effect on the merits of the
grievance, total non-cooperation is an
aggravating factor, and was so viewed
even before the court began using the
Standards.30
Less egregious forms of non-coopera-
tion also will be considered as aggravat-
ing factors. A failure to cooperate with
the investigatory stage of the discipli-
nary process, 3' making misleading state-
ments during the disciplinary proceed-
ing,32 a delay in cooperating with the
disciplinary process33 and other failures
to cooperate fully34 all have been used as
aggravating factors.
Conversely, cooperation with the dis-
ciplinary process can serve to mitigate
the sanction the court imposes.35 Full
and complete cooperation (along with
other mitigating factors) enabled an at-
torney who otherwise would have been
disbarred to receive only a suspension. 36
While there is no specific value placed
on cooperation as a mitigating factor, it
is a factor that repeatedly has been used
by the court and over which counsel has
some control even after he or she has
committed an ethical violation. Again,
there is a similarity to sentencing in
criminal cases. Both the Colorado37 and
federa 38 sentencing schemes establish
cooperation with the authorities as a mit-
igating factor.
Length of Practice
Substantial experience in the practice
of law is seen as an aggravating factor
under the Standards, while inexperi-
ence in the practice of law is seen as a
mitigating factor. Using the experience
of counsel in fashioning the appropriate
sanction raises these two questions:
why should experience be a factor, and
where does the court draw the line?
Suggesting that experience in practic-
ing law justifies a more severe sanction
has superficial appeal on the theory that
"he (or she) should have known bet-
ter." However, in this author's opinion,
that theory is erroneous for three rea-
sons. First, a new lawyer, who has just
finished law school and passed the bar
exam (both of which have an ethics com-
ponent) should be as fully informed of a
lawyer's ethical obligations as a sea-
soned veteran is. Second, many of the
ethical rules and guidelines are simple
and straightforward proscriptions
against immoral and illegal acts, such
as stealing and lying. It does not take
years of practice to understand that
committing these types of acts is both
wrong and unethical. Finally, any
lawyer, whether new or experienced,
should have the common sense to seek
help when faced with an issue, ethical
or otherwise, that he or she does not un-
derstand.
Nevertheless, the fact is that length of
practice is a factor established by the
Standards and accepted by the Colorado
Supreme Court. Thus, the more practi-
cal issue becomes the point at which
counsel moves from being inexperienced
to being experienced. The Standards do
not establish a specific point in time at
which counsel is deemed "experienced,"
nor does the case law. However, some
general boundaries are emerging.
The court has held that an attorney
has "substantial experience," and is sub-
ject to aggravation on that basis, when
the attorney had thirteen years of expe-
rience.39 At the other end, the court has
held that an attorney with six to eight
years of practicing law is "inexperi-
enced."4
The particular field of practice in
which the misconduct arises can influ-
ence the decision as to whether a partic-
ular length of time in practice consti-
tutes experience or inexperience. In Peo-
ple v. Pooley,41 the attorney had been
practicing law for eleven years, but had
only been practicing in the specific field
(medical malpractice) in which the prob-
lem arose for two years. This level of ex-
perience was seen as a mitigating factor.
However, in People v. Nichols,42 two
years of practice was not seen as a miti-
gating factor because the ethical viola-
tion involved a failure "to perform the
most basic legal tasks, not [an] inability
to comprehend the legal issues sur-
rounding those tasks.""
Other Factors Under
The Standards
The Standards consider a pattern of
misconduct and the existence of multi-
ple offenses an aggravating factor. The
court may find a pattern of misconduct
when counsel has violated several disci-
plinary rules in connection with the rep-
resentation of a single client or has vio-
lated a disciplinary rule in connection
with several clients."
A willingness to make restitution, or
an indifference toward the same, is a
factor the court will consider. Counsel
must indicate voluntarily a willingness
to make restitution. If the restitution is
forced or compelled, Standard 9.4(a)
views the fact of restitution as irrel-
evant. A refusal to acknowledge the
wrongful nature of the conduct is an ag-
gravating factor and, conversely, the
presence of genuine remorse is a miti-
gating factor.45
The imposition of other sanctions
against the attorney may affect the
sanction imposed in the disciplinary
proceeding. The one Colorado case di-
rectly addressing this issue held that
the imposition of a money judgment di-
rectly against counsel in the probate
case that was the subject of the griev-
ance constituted a mitigating factor.46
The Illinois Supreme Court has held
that the imposition of a separate sanc-
tion may satisfy the goals of the disci-
plinary process and, thus, eliminate the
need for any disciplinary action.47
The imposition of sanctions by an at-
torney discipline body in another juris-
diction also has an impact. The court
generally imposes the same discipline
upon an attorney who is licensed in
another state and is disciplined in the
other jurisdiction, unless one of four
exceptions has been established."
This rule is set forth in Colorado Rules
of Civil Procedure ("C.R.C.P.") Rule
241.17 and also is the procedure recom-
mended by Standard 2.9. The excep-
tions allow for a different result when
(1) the foreign jurisdiction's procedures
did not comport with due process, (2)
the proof used in the foreign jurisdiction
was so infirm that the court cannot rely
on the foreign jurisdiction's determina-
tion, (3) imposition of the same sanction
would be a grave injustice or (4) the mis-
conduct warrants a substantially differ-
ent form of discipline.49 A sanction im-
posed on this basis ordinarily will run
concurrently with the sanction imposed
by the other jurisdiction.50
Again, it should be noted that many
of these factors are identical or similar
to many of the factors used by judges
when imposing sentences in criminal
cases.
Miscellaneous Factors
The court is willing to find mitigation
in a factor that is not explicitly men-
tioned in the Standards. In People v.
Auld,5 the attorney reluctantly agreed
to hold illegal weapons proffered to him
by an undercover police officer posing as
a potential client. When the district at-
torney offered to drop the criminal
charges if the attorney acted as an infor-
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mant against some of his other clients,
the attorney refused. The court noted
that accepting contraband in exchange
for legal services previously had been
held to merit a one-year suspension,5 2
but that informing on clients previously
had resulted in the even more serious
sanction of a two-year suspension." Bal-
ancing the seriousness of this offense
against the refusal to violate the attor-
ney-client privilege, the court held that
a six-month suspension was the appro-
priate sanction.
Probation as an
Alternative Sanction
Under Standard 2.7 and the commen-
tary following it,
[p]robation is a sanction that allows a
lawyer to practice law under specified
conditions.... Probation is a sanction
that should be imposed when a
lawyer's right to practice law needs to
be monitored or limited rather than
suspended or revoked.
A number of other states have imposed
probation as a sanction in disciplinary
cases. Conditions in these cases have in-
cluded reports on caseload status," su-
pervision by another lawyer,5 5 periodic
audits of trust accounts,56 continuing le-
gal education,57 participation in sub-
stance abuse programs58 and periodic
mental or physical examinations.5
While the Colorado Supreme Court of-
ten bases reinstatement on the fulfill-
ment of certain conditions,6 it does not
use probation as a sanction.
A probationary alternative, in appro-
priate cases, serves all of the purposes of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Therefore, in this author's opinion, the
court should consider the adoption of a
probationary alternative in ethical vio-
lations in Colorado.
Conclusion
The imposition of sanctions on
lawyers who have committed ethical vi-
olations can be viewed as analogous to
the imposition of a sentence in a crimi-
nal case. The goals of protecting the
public, deterring future misconduct and
rehabilitation are common to both pro-
ceedings. Many of the other goals under-
lying the two proceedings are similar.
The aggravating and mitigating fac-
tors established in the Standards and
adopted by the Colorado Supreme Court
also are strikingly similar to the factors
that sentencing courts consider in crimi-
nal cases. Counsel facing a disciplinary
proceeding should take advantage of ev-
ery opportunity to cooperate with the
disciplinary process and to engage in re-
medial action in order to mitigate the
severity of the sanction.
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